CRIMINAL

LAW-ENTRAPMENT

ESTABLISHED AS

A MATTER

OF

LAW WHEN PERSON ACTING IN CONCERT WITH POLICE PROVIDES ACCUSED WITH CONTRABAND AND THEN ARRANGES A SALE
OF THAT SAME CONTRABAND

TO AN UNDERCOVER OFFICER-

State v. Talbot, 71 N.J. 160, 364 A.2d 9 (1976).
Anthony Federici, after having been arrested on a narcotics
charge, agreed to aid the police by setting up transactions with drug
dealers in exchange for a promise of lenient treatment.' John Talbot,
a friend, was suggested and approved as a potential target. 2 Proceeding without specific police direction, Federici then sold a packet of
heroin to Talbot, and later requested that Talbot resell it to an acquaintance " 'from somewhere out west.' "3 Talbot, who had initially
refused to buy the heroin, also objected to selling it, but later agreed
to the sale after an appeal by Federici. 4 Talbot was subsequently visited by Federici and an undercover agent posing as the acquaintance,
and he was arrested after selling the agent some of the heroin pur5
chased from Federici.
Talbot urged at trial that he had been entrapped as a matter of
law since Federici, acting for the police, had supplied Talbot with the
heroin and induced him to make the sale "for the express purpose of
entrapping" him. 6 Furthermore, Talbot claimed that the evidence
supporting entrapment was "uncontroverted," and that no " 'proper

7
proof' " of Talbot's "predisposition" had been proffered by the state.
The trial judge rejected Talbot's motion for acquittal, however, and

I State

v. Talbot, 71 N.J. 160, 163, 364 A.2d 9, 10 (1976).
2 id.
3Id. at 163-64, 364 A.2d at 10-11.
4 Id. at 163, 364 A.2d at 10.
5 Id.; see Brief and Appendix for the State of New Jersey at 4, State v. Talbot, 135
N.J. Super. 500, 343 A.2d 777 (App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 71 N.J. 160, 364 A.2d 9 (1976)
[hereinafter Brief for State].
6 State v. Talbot, 135 N.J. Super. 500, 503, 343 A.2d 777, 778 (App. Div. 1975),
aff'd, 71 N.J. 160, 364 A.2d 9 (1976).
7 State v. Talbot, 135 N.J. Super. 500, 503, 343 A.2d 777, 778 (App. Div. 1975),
aff'd, 71 N.J. 160, 364 A.2d 9 (1976). On the subject of predisposition, the New Jersey
supreme court has stated that it "is evidenced by previous conviction of crime, reputation for criminal activities, ready compliance with minimal inducement, or easy yielding
to the opportunity to commit the offense." State v. Dolce, 41 N.J. 422, 433, 197 A.2d
185, 191 (1964). In Talbot, the state showed that the defendant had been a marihuana
user, and that he had pleaded guilty to both possession of narcotics in New York and
injection of barbituates into the arm of a high school girl in Rhode Island. 135 N.J.
Super. at 505, 343 A.2d at 779; Brief for State, supra note 5, at 11.
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proceeded to charge the jury that the defense of entrapment was unavailable "unless Federici . . . 'was acting with the consent of the
8
police and as their agent' " when he supplied the heroin to Talbot.
The jury found Talbot guilty and he appealed. 9
The appellate division reasoned that determination of the entrapment issue was properly one for the jury because of the doubtful
veracity of both Talbot's and Federici's testimony.' 0 Reversible error
was found to exist, however, in the trial judge's charge to the jury."
The court had instructed that entrapment could not be found by the
jury unless Federici was shown to have consummated the transaction
in question with the consent of the police. 12 The appellate division
stated that the instructions "effectively insulated the [s]tate" from as13
suming its burden of proving that an entrapment had not occurred.
After remand for retrial, 14 the state's petition for certification was
granted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.15
In State v. Talbot,16 the court held that entrapment is established
as a matter of law when a person working in cooperation with the
police provides the accused with heroin and subsequently orchestrates the sale of the drug to an undercover officer. 17 The court
further held that entrapment exists even though narcotics are supplied without the permission or knowledge of the police and despite a
8 See State v. Talbot, 135 N.J. Super. 500, 503, 509, 343 A.2d 777, 778, 781 (App.
Div. 1975), aff'd, 71 N.J. 160, 364 A.2d 9 (1976).
9 State v. Talbot, 71 N.J. 160, 162-63, 364 A.2d 9, 10 (1976).
10 State v. Talbot, 135 N.J. Super. 500, 507-08, 343 A.2d 777, 781 (App. Div. 1975),
aff'd, 71 N.J. 160, 364 A.2d 9 (1976).
11 State v. Talbot, 135 N.J. Super. 500, 509-10, 343 A.2d 777, 781-82. (App. Div.
1975), aff'd, 71 N.J. 160, 364 A.2d 9 (1976).
12State v. Talbot, 135 N.J. Super. 500, 509, 343 A.2d 777, 781 (App. Div. 1975),
aff'd, 71 N.J. 160, 364 A.2d 9 (1976).
13 State v. Talbot, 135 N.J. Super. 500, 509, 343 A.2d 777, 781 (App. Div. 1975),
aff'd, 71 N.J. 160, 364 A.2d 9 (1976). Judge Allcorn, writing for the court reasoned that
[t]he manufacture of crime, whether by the police or by an informant employed
by the police, cannot be countenanced. However desirable and helpful the employment of an informant may be in the pursuit and discovery of criminal activity and evidence of crime, law enforcement authorities may not disavow him
and disclaim responsibility for his actions when he entraps someone because
they had no knowledge and did not approve of the entrapment.
135 N.J. Super. at 509, 343 A.2d at 782.
14 State v. Talbot, 135 N.J. Super. 500, 512, 343 A.2d 777, 783 (App. Div. 1975),
aff'd, 71 N.J. 160, 364 A.2d 9 (1976).
'5 State v. Talbot, 69 N.J. 81, 351 A.2d 9 (1975).
1671 N.J. 160, 364 A.2d 9 (1976). Justice Schreiber wrote a concurring opinion in
which Chief Justice Hughes joined. Id. at 169, 364 A.2d at 13; see notes 86-90 infra and
accompanying text.
17 71 N.J. at 168, 364 A.2d at 13.
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predisposition on the part of the defendant to sell the contraband. 18
The court did agree with the appellate division, however, that the
evidence in the Talbot case was sufficiently contradictory to establish
a jury question as to the plausibility of the testimony and affirmed the
appellate court's order of a new trial. 19
The doctrine of entrapment 20 has been regarded by commentators as primarily an American development. 2 l While no clear exposition of its origin exists, it has been plausibly suggested that entrapment
developed from the " 'consent' defenses" which were recognized at
common law when a victim had "assisted the principle [sic] offender"
in the perpetration of a crime. 22 Gradually, though, entrapment came
18 id.

19Id. at 169, 364 A.2d at 13.
20 The most durable definition of entrapment was proffered by Justice Roberts in a
concurring opinion in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), when he stated
"[elntrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the
trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer." Id. at 454. See generally People v. Strong,
21 111. 2d 320, 324, 172 N.E.2d 765, 767 (1961). A slightly different formulation is found
in 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 132, at 281 (R. Anderson ed. 1957)

where the author states that
[e]ntrapment in its literal sense means merely the act of trapping ...
Through usage its meaning has been broadened, and it has come to mean the
act of inducing or leading a person to commit a crime not originally contemplated by him, for the purpose of trapping him in its commission and prosecuting him for the offense.
Id. (footnote omitted).
21 DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory
and Application, 1 U.S.F.L. REV. 243, 244-45, 247-48 (1967); Mikell, The Doctrine of
Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 246 (1942). Professor Mikell
discovered only one English case, Regina v. Titley, 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 502 (Cent. Crim.
Ct. 1880), in which the accused was entrapped. Mikell, supra at 246 n.2. The defense,
however, was not raised and the court did not consider it. Id.; cf. Rex v. Martin, 168
Eng. Rep. 757 (C.C.R. 1811) (excusing an entrapped defendant), discussed in R.
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 1031-32 (2d ed. 1969). For further discussion of early British

development in this area, see DeFeo, supra at 245-47.
22 Murchison, The Entrapment Defense in Federal Courts: Emergence of a Legal
Doctrine, 47 Miss. L.J. 211, 214 n.ll (1976); J. MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW

§ 59, at 179 (1934); see Orfield, The Defense of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1967
DUKE L.J. 39, 40. Under this theory, for example, a defendant could assert a valid defense against a charge of larceny if the property had been taken with the consent of the
owner. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 115 N.C. 775, 782, 20 S.E. 722, 722 (1894); State v.
Hull, 33 Or. 56, 61-62, 54 P. 159, 161 (1898). For an early treatise which defines entrapment in terms of consent, see W. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW § 2, at 12

(3d ed. 1915). Professor Mikell also offered an acceptable explanation of the origin of
the doctrine, stating that
[i]n truth there seems to be no rational basis for the doctrine. Its origin is to be
found in the natural feeling, shared by judges, that a person should not be
made the victim of what Mr. Justice Holmes called [in another context] "dirty
business".
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to be defined as a "suggestion of the criminal act . . . from the officers of the government.' ' 23 This form of the defense was extensively
developed during the thirteen years (1920 to 1933) of Prohibition,
when the effective enforcement of the ban on sale and consumption
of alcohol necessitated "provid[ing] suspects with the opportunity to
commit an offense." 2 4 However, it was not until Sorrells v. United
States,2 5 decided during the last year of Prohibition, that entrapment
26
was fully explored and defined by the Supreme Court.
Mikell, supra note 21, at 263 (quoting in part from Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 470 (1927)); see Orfield, supra at 57. See generally People v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7,
15, 210 N.W.2d 336, 338-39 (1973) (tracing origin of the doctrine to Saunders v. People,
38 Mich. 218 (1878)).
23Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1915) (first acceptance of
entrapment defense by a federal court). See generally Donnelly, Judicial Control of
Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1098-99
(1951). In Woo Wai, officials working for the Immigration Commission, for the purpose
of uncovering certain corrupt public servants, induced the defendant to enter into a plan
to smuggle Chinese people residing in Mexico into the United States. 223 F. at 412-13.
The court found that Woo Wai originally had been reluctant to participate in the plan,
but eventually had acquiesced "to enter into the scheme which had been so assiduously
and persistently urged upon him." Id. at 414. The court reversed Woo Wai's conviction,
finding "that a sound public policy can be upheld only by denying the criminality of
those who are thus induced to commit acts which infringe the letter of the criminal
statutes." Id. at 415.
Professor Orfield has noted that the first federal cases to suggest an entrapment
defense, but without offering a "concrete delineation of the new doctrine," Orfield,
supra note 22, at 40, were United States v. Whittier, 28 F. Cas. 591 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1878)
(No. 16,688), and United States v. Adams, 59 F. 674 (D. Or. 1894). Orfield, supra at
40-41. In Adams, the court found that the conviction of a defendant for unlawfully sending contraceptive information through the mail in response to a decoy letter written by a
government agent could not be sustained because the inspector "was . . . not engaged
in detecting crime, but in procuring its commission." 59 F. at 677. A comprehensive
listing of early cases dealing with the defense of entrapment can be found in O'Brien v.
United States, 51 F.2d 674, 678 n.1 (7th Cir. 1931).
24 Murchison, supra note 22, at 211-12, 216-17. The need for some police artifice
was later recognized by the drafters of the Model Penal Code, who stated that "in the
enforcement of vice, liquor or narcotics laws, it is all but impossible to obtain evidence
for prosecution save by the use of decoys. There are rarely complaining witnesses."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment, at 16 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959), cited in 2 NEW
JERSEY PENAL CODE § 2C:2-12, Comment, at 75-76 (Proposed Final Draft 1971). See
also 1 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING
PAPERS, 313 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1970) [hereinafter cited as BROWN COMMISSION
REPORT].
25 287 U.S. 435 (1932), analyzed in DeFeo, supra note 21, at 251-58; Donnelly,
supra note 23, at 1099-1104; Murchison, supra note 22, at 225-36.
26 See 287 U.S. at 443-46, 451-52; Murchison, supra note 22, at 216-25, 230; Or-

field, supra note 22, at 43; Note, Entrapment in the Federal Courts: Sixty Years of
Frustration, 10 NEW ENG. L. REV. 179, 184 (1974). Prior to Sorrells, the Supreme Court

had recognized the use of decoys as an acceptable means of police detection. See, e.g.,
Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1895). But cf. Casey v. United States
276 U.S. 413, 423 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (government may not use undercover
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In Sorrells, a prohibition agent posing as a tourist visited Sorrells' home with some mutual acquaintances. 27 Conversation revealed
that Sorrells and the agent, Martin, had served in the same army
division during World War I. While reminiscing about wartime experiences, Agent Martin made several requests that Sorrells purchase
liquor for him. After initially refusing, Sorrells finally acquiesced and
procured a half-gallon of alcohol. 28 At trial, the federal district court
ruled as a matter of law that there had been no entrapment. 29 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed 30 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to determine whether the defense of entrapment should have been
submitted to the jury. 3 ' The Court indicated that conflicting testimony between the defendant and the government's witnesses
created a factual issue, and that a jury could have found that the
criminal design originated with the prohibition agent rather than with
32
the defendant.
A majority of the Court then adopted what has been termed the
"subjective approach," which examines government conduct to determine if the criminal design originated with the police, but which
33
places the ultimate focus on the predisposition of the accused.
agents to manufacture crime). In Sorrells, the Court noted that later holdings, permitting
an assertion of the entrapment defense, were careful to note that the allowable use of
decoys was "well settled." 287 U.S. at 441.
27 287 U.S. at 439.
28

Id.

29 Id.

at 438.

3) Sorrells v. United States, 57 F.2d 973 (4th Cir.), rev'd, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that mere requests by an
agent which result in violations of the law should not make the defense of entrapment
available. 57 F.2d at 974. In reaching its decision, it was necessary for the circuit court
to distinguish its earlier ruling in Newman v. United States, 299 F. 128 (4th Cir. 1924),
which had stated in dictum that where the government implants a criminal scheme in
the mind of the accused it must be "estopped" from prosecuting. Id. at 131. The court
of appeals found that Newman should not be interpreted to mean that one who harbors
a willingness to commit a crime and does so because of persuasion by the government
should be excused. 57 F.2d at 976.
31 287 U.S. at 436, 439.
32 See id. at 441, 452.
33 Recent Development, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 546, 550 n.33 (1974); see 287 U.S. at
441-42, 451. After the Sorrells decision, the "twin elements of inducement and
predisposition, when conjoined, form[ed] the . . . recognized basis for the entrapment
defense." BROWN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 24, at 306 (emphasis in original). If
the criminal intent is found to have been the product of the law enforcement official,
the defense of entrapment is available to the defendant; if instead, the design originated
with the accused, he will be barred from asserting the defense. Donnelly, supra note
23, at 1102; Murchison, supra note 22, at 234-35. This view has been commonly called
"subjective because the same course of police conduct could yield findings of both guilt
and innocence when applied to different defendants with differing degrees of predis-
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Under the majority's analysis, the defendant must withstand a
"searching inquiry into his own conduct" to determine if he
was
predisposed. 3 4 Concluding that Sorrells could have been deemed a
"law-abiding citizen" who was "otherwise innocent," 35 the majority
reasoned that the congressional intent underlying the prohibition
laws, which Sorrells had been charged with violating, was not to extend liability to innocent people induced into crime by the actions of
government officials. 3 6 Since a jury could have reached a verdict of
position." Recent Development, supra at 550 n.33.
Professor Donnelly suggests that a major problem with the subjective approach
arises from the misapprehension that intent "can easily be isolated and assigned in toto
to either the defendant or the officer." Donnelly, supra at 1107-08. A further difficulty
is the means employed to measure intent: if the evidence reveals past crimes of a similar nature committed by the defendant, the intent is said to have originated with the
defendant and not the government agent. Id. at 1102, 1107-08. See also Mikell, supra
note 21, at 252.
s4287 U.S. at 451. The Court noted that the government may introduce evidence
concerning "the conduct and purposes of the defendant previous to the alleged offense"
in order to show that he was not "otherwise innocent." Id. One reason suggested for the
use of evidence concerning prior criminal conduct is that it permits an inference by the
jury "that government conduct amounting to inducement did not cause the criminal act
or that the defendant actually conceived the crime." Orfield, supra note 22, at 59 & n.
122 (emphasis in original).
The fact that the government may introduce evidence concerning the criminal history or bad reputation of the accused has been severely criticized. See Grossman v.
State, 457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alas. 1969); State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375, 382 (Iowa 1974);
People v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7, 21-22, 210 N.W.2d 336, 341-42 (1973); Williams, The
Defense of Entrapment and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28 FORDHAM L.
REV. 339, 411 (1959) ("[s]uch proof... is wholly irrelevant to the issue of [guilt;] [tio
allow . . . proof of defendant's character . . . gives the defendant the right to plead

entrapment only at his peril and is inconsistent with [fair trial] safeguards"); 33
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1033, 1038 (1958) (application of the subjective test effectively deprives a
defendant with a prior criminal record of the defense and leaves him vulnerable to
"whatever instigative conduct the police may deem expedient").
35 287 U.S. at 441.
36 Id. at 448. In stating that a statute must be construed in a reasonable manner, the
Court noted that to interpret a law literally might lead to "absurd consequences or flagrant injustice." Id. at 446. The Court found that it was "not forced by the letter to do
violence to the spirit and purpose of the statute." Id. at 448.
After Sorrells, the lower federal and state courts either ignored the statutory-intent
rationale and instead based the defense on estoppel or public policy, or merely allowed
"the defense without analysis of its foundation." DeFeo, supra note 21, at 256, 258; see
Donnelly, supra note 23, at 1110. An interesting comment, proffered by the Brown
Commission, characterized the statutory intent theory as
a matter of historical accident. If the decision in Sorrells . . . had been announced only a few years later, it is likely that [the] Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its then self-established supervisory power over the administration
of criminal justice within the Federal courts, would not have had to turn to
statutory construction to divine the source of the entrapment defense. The defense could then have stood on the same and firmer footing of the McNabb-
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not guilty by finding that Sorrells was an innocent person lured into
crime by a government agent, the trial court's decision was reversed
37
and remanded.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Roberts advocated an alternative
theory, or "objective" approach, which focuses on the nature of the
government's participation rather than on the predisposition of
the defendant. 3 8 Under this "objective" test, the willingness of the
accused to engage in the criminal act is not considered, but rather,
the critical inquiry is whether the crime was actually manufactured
or instigated by government agents. 39 Instead of a legislative intent
or statutory construction rationale for the entrapment defense, as
espoused by the majority, the concurring opinion rested its conclusion "on a fundamental rule of public policy. '"40 Government agents
should not be permitted to create crime, induce its commission, and
subsequently present "so revolting a plan" before a tribunal for prosecution. 4 1 Following this rationale, Justice Roberts urged that a finding of entrapment should be within the province of the trial judge and
42
not the jury.
The Supreme Court next considered entrapment twenty-six years
later in Sherman v. United States.4 3 In that case a government inforIndeed, but for the somewhat attenuated logic of
Mallory exclusionary rule ....
the decision in Sorrells, entrapment might have become a matter of criminal
procedure rather than the substantive defense to crime it is today.
BROWN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 24, at 314 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in
original).
37 287 U.S. at 441, 452.
38 See id. at 458-59.
39 Id.; see Recent Development, supra note 33, at 550 & n.33. According to Justice
Roberts, police conduct rises to an intolerable level of participation when "a law officer
envisages a crime, plans it, and activates its commission by one not theretofore intending its perpetration." 287 U.S. at 454.
40 287 U.S. at 457. When a defendant has proved he was entrapped into committing
the offense, Justice Roberts would mandate that the court stop further prosecution:
The applicable principle is that courts must be closed to the trial of a crime
instigated by the government's own agents. No other issue, no comparison of
equities as between the guilty official and the guilty defendant, has any place
in the enforcement of this overruling principle of public policy.
Id. at 459.
41 Id. at 454-55; cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the government must come to court with
clean hands out of respect for our system of justice).
42 287 U.S. at 457.
- 356 U.S. 369 (1958). Despite the favorable Sorrells decision, until the 1940's, the
entrapment defense was infrequently asserted during the period after the repeal of the
eighteenth amendment in 1933. Murchison, supra note 22, at 233-34; Murchison, The
Entrapment Defense in Federal Courts: Modern Developments, 47 Miss. L.J. 573, 573
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mant, Kalchinian, initially met Sherman in a doctor's office where
a
both were "apparently" undergoing treatment for drug addiction."
During several accidental meetings between the two, conversation
revealed mutual problems in receiving effective treatment. 4 5 Kalchinian told Sherman that the treatment being administered was not
successful and repeatedly asked him to procure some drugs, to which
46
Sherman, based on the informer's feigned suffering, finally agreed.
Kalchinian then reported this arrangment to officials of the Bureau
47
of Narcotics, who observed Sherman give the drugs to the informer.
The majority of the Court declined to follow Justice Roberts'
opinion in Sorrells but utilized the subjective test and the statutory
construction reasoning of the majority in that case. 48 The Court, con49
cluding that Sherman. had been entrapped as a matter of law,
reasoned that uncontradicted evidence in the record showed that
Sherman was "an otherwise unwilling person" who had been lured
50
into crime by the repeated requests of the government informer.
& n.3 (1976). However, the use of undercover officers gradually has been extended to
prosecutions of prostitution, homosexuality, gambling and narcotics, thus providing
another major impetus to the entrapment defense. DeFeo, supra note 21, at 250.
44 356 U.S. at 371.
45 Id.
46 Id.

Kalchinian paid for his portion of the drug as well as all necessary expenses
incurred in obtaining it, including cab fare. Id.
47 Id. The Court noted that Kalchinian had been convicted of selling narcotics and
had received leniency for cooperating with the government. See id. at 374 & n.2. Even
though the federal narcotics agents did not counsel Kalchinian in arranging transactions
with drug addicts, the Court found that "[t]he Government cannot make such use of an
informer and then claim disassociation through ignorance." Id. at 375.
48 Id. at 372-73, 376. The Court declined to adopt a test focusing on government
conduct not only because the majority in Sorrells had declined to accept this approach,
but also because, as reflected by the record, the alternative theory had not been urged
by the parties. Id. According to the majority, the adoption of the objective approach
without argument would have been contrary to principles of stare decisis and would
have produced two major ramifications. First, it would have imposed a "handicap" on
the prosecution by barring it from offering proof of the defendant's predisposition. Id. at
376-77. Secondly, it would have altered the procedural aspects of the entrapment defense by submitting the issue of entrapment, based on the activity of the police, to the
judge instead of the jury. Id. at 377. Justice Warren concluded that to disregard the test
espoused by the majority in Sorrells and instead adopt the approach advocated by Justice Roberts, "would be creating more problems than we would supposedly be solving."
Id. at 378.
49 Id. at 373.
50 Id. at 371-73. There was a companion case decided the same day as Sherman,
Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386 (1958), where the defendant also urged that his
conviction should be reversed on the grounds that he was entrapped as a matter of law.
Id. at 388. The Court, however, rejected this claim, holding that a credibility issue with
respect to petitioner's own testimony of the transaction was properly submitted to the
jury. Id.
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Reiterating the principles enunciated in Sorrells, the majority stated
that the issue of entrapment involves dual considerations-the level
of official conduct and the defendant's predisposition to criminal
activity. 5 ' The majority justified its holding by reasoning that "Conwere to be enforced by
gress could not have intended that its statutes
52
tempting innocent persons into violations."Justice Frankfurter, joined by three other justices, concurred,
but also indicated that he was ready to adopt the position urged by
Justice Roberts in Sorrells.53 Referring to the Sherman majority's
statutory construction reasoning as "sheer fiction," Justice Frankfurter
argued that the correct rationale for dismissing entrapped defendants
was that "the methods employed on behalf of the Government to
bring about conviction cannot be countenanced. - 5 4 He contended
that rather than concentrating upon the defendant's actions, a trial
court should focus on whether the involvement of law enforcement
authorities in the criminal enterprise has exceeded permissible
limits. 55 Police may employ decoys and traps to apprehend law violators, but these techniques should not be directed to those "who
would normally avoid crime and through self-struggle resist ordinary
temptations. "56
The objective approach advocated by Justice Frankfurter, and
earlier by Justice Roberts, was favorably treated by commentators
51 356 U.S. at 372-73. For a discussion of the subjective approach set forth in
Sorrells, see notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text.
52 356 U.S. at 372. One commentator states that the use of this language expanded
the statutory construction rationale developed from the National Prohibition Act, violated in Sorrells, into a "sweeping generalization." Murchison, supra note 43, at 575.
53 See 356 U.S. at 378-79, 382. In response to the majority's argument that to adopt
the objective approach would be to formulate important policies without benefit of argument, Justice Frankfurter stated that the solution would be to allow the parties to reargue the case. Id. at 379 & n.2.
54 Id. at 379-80. Justice Frankfurter stated that the reason for excusing an entrapped
defendant should be grounded upon "a supervisory jurisdiction over the administration
of criminal justice" instead "of a wholly fictitious congressional intent." Id. at 381.
55 Id. at 382, 385. In applying this test, the predisposition of the defendant becomes
"wholly irrelevant." Id. at 382.
-1 Id. at 384. Commenting on the objective approach, the Brown Commission Report noted that:
There is no room in the Roberts-Frankfurter appraisal for a subjective determination of the predisposition of a particular defendant to commit this or any
other crime. . . . Evidence of predisposition is irrelevant. Emphasis is misThe standard of Justices Roberts
placed when predisposition is put in issue ....
and Frankfurter is objective, i.e., is it likely that the questioned police action
would induce only those who are then ready and willing into crime.
BROWN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 24, at 316 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in

original).
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after the Sherman decision and by the drafters
Code. 57 In addition, several lower federal courts
propriate circumstances, to find entrapment as a
on the grounds of excessive official conduct. 58

of the Model
were willing,
matter of law
These courts

Penal
in apsolely
based

57 Murchison, supra note 43, at 580. The objective approach was also adopted in
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The Model Penal Code
provided, in an alternative formulation, that
(1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with
such an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by either:
(a) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or
(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a
substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other
than those who are ready to commit it.
Id. § 2.13 (1). The drafters noted that this version "sp[oke] only to the conduct of the
police" and that it was their preferred solution. Id. Comment, at 19 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959). The Model Penal Code further provides that the issue of entrapment will be
decided by the trial judge and not the jury. Id. § 2.13(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
In proposing a federal entrapment statute, the Brown Commission Report commented that
[t]he proposed statute changes the existing law by giving principal significance to the inducements of the government. Entrapment is continued as a
defense to a crime, but the question of the accused's predisposition is removed
and the issue is framed rather in the objective terms of whether persons at large
who would not otherwise have done so would have been encouraged by the
government's actions to engage in crime. The focus of the proposed statute is
on the activities of the government and their relation to the reasonable man.
BROWN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 24, at 306. For a collection of commentary
critical of the subjective approach, see Murchison, supra at 580 & n.49; 25 MERCER L.
REV. 957, 961-62 & n.41 (1974).
58 See, e.g., United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir. 1972) (to allow
a conviction to stand where the police manufactured and delivered counterfeit money
would be "repugnant to the most elemental notions of justice"), vacated and remanded,
412 U.S. 936 (1973); Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1971) (the
government may not prosecute when it "involve[s] itself so directly and continuously
. . . in the creation and maintenance of criminal operations"); United States v. Bueno,
447 F.2d 903, 905 (5th Cir. 1971) (the activity of the government in supplying the defendant with heroin in order to buy it back and charge him with the crime "greatly
exceeds the bounds of reason"), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973).
By 1973, the above mentioned "three circuits had clearly inched toward the objective test urged by Mr. Justice Frankfurter." Murchison, supra note 43, at 585-88. See
also Recent Development, supra note 33, at 557, 562-63; 25 MERCER L. REV. 957,
962-63 (1974). Despite the fact that the circuit courts began to scrutinize government
conduct with increasing frequency, the subjective approach remained the controlling
test. See Murchison, supra at 588 & n.9 7 . In United States v. Granger, 475 F.2d 1022,
1023-24 (9th Cir. 1973), the court rejected a defendant's attempt to cite as controlling
precedents Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971), and United States v.
Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), in which findings of
entrapment were based on excessive government participation, because
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their decisions on a specific factual situation where either the government supplied contraband to a defendant or there existed a general pattern of extensive government participation and encouragement. 5 9 In one case, where the sole activity of the government was
the supply of an essential ingredient for the manufacture of a drug to a
a predisposed defendant, the Ninth Circuit court of appeals nevertheless concluded that the government not only had entrapped the defendant, but also had violated "fundamental concepts of due process."60
The Supreme Court, however, in United States v. Russell, 6 1 reversed
in a five-to-four decision and mandated a return to "the traditional
62
notion of entrapment."
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Russell, rejected
the defendant's attempt to establish "a rigid constitutional rule"
which would bar prosecution whenever a government agent is found
to have supplied a necessary ingredient, either legally or illegally obtained, to further the criminal enterprise.6 3 While the majority ac-

these two decisions carve out a narrow exception to the . . . prevailing rule in
this circuit that an entrapment defense is not available to one who is shown to
have a predisposition to commit the kind of offense in question.
475 F.2d at 1023. See also United States v. Abbadessa, 470 F.2d 1333, 1336-37 (10th
Cir. 1972); Accardi v. United States, 257 F.2d 168, 171, 173 (5th Cir. 1958).
59 Compare United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972), vacated and
remanded, 412 U.S. 936 (1973) and United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir.
1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) and Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir.
1971) with United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
949 (1973). See Case Comment, Entrapment Rationale Employed to Condemn
Government's Furnishingof Contraband, 59 MINN. L. REV. 444, 448-49 (1974).
60 United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423
(1973). In Sherman, Chief Justice Warren had hinted that a constitutional rationale
might underlie the entrapment defense when outrageous law enforcement tactics "become as objectionable . . . as the coerced confession and the unlawful search." 356 U.S.
at 372. Since Sherman, however, "the courts have balked at elevating the defense to
constitutional dimensions." Orfield, supra note 22, at 54. But see United States v.
Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307, 1312 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (the court specifically based its holding upon constitutional safeguards, reasoning that "[e]ntrapment is indistinguishable
from other law enforcement practices which the courts have held to violate due process").
61 411 U.S. 423 (1973), noted in The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1, 243-52 (1973); Recent Decision, The Defense of Entrapment is Available Solely to a
Defendant who Lacked Predisposition to Commit the Crime, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 802
(1974); Recent Development, supra note 33; 25 MERCER L. REV. 957 (1974).
62 411 U.S. at 427, 435-36. In Russell, the Supreme Court found that the activity of
the agent in offering to supply the defendant with a legal but difficult-to-obtain ingredient in the manufacturing of an illegal drug was a permissible law enforcement tactic
directed toward "an 'unwary criminal.' " Id. at 435-36 (quoting from Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. at 372).
63 411 U.S. at 431. The defendant urged that the amount of the agent's participation
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knowledged that a situation might exist where the government could
not convict an entrapped defendant without also violating the due
64
process clause, it rejected Russell's claim that this was such a case.
Criticizing the lower courts' expansion of the defense to include excessive governmental participation, the plurality stated that the defense was not meant to provide the federal courts with "a 'chancellor's foot' veto over" unacceptable law enforcement practices.

65

The

Court declined to overrule the principles which were formulated in
Sorrells and Sherman and found the defendant's predisposition "fatal
to his claim of entrapment. '"66 In Russell, the majority emphasized
that the government had supplied only a legal, albeit scarce, ingre67
dient for the manufacture of an illicit drug.
The question, left unanswered in Russell, of whether the goy-

ernment can supply contraband to a defendant and subsequently prosecute him for selling it to an undercover agent was addressed by
another divided Court in Hampton v. United States. 6 8 In Hampton,
in the criminal scheme was such that to prosecute him would violate his due process
rights. Id. at 430. Rejecting an analogy between entrapment and illegal searches and
seizures, the Court found that the agent's participation had "violated no independent
constitutional right." Id.
64 Id. at 431-32. The Court cited Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 166 (1952),
where the defendant's stomach was pumped to produce two capsules to be used in
evidence against him at trial, as the type of a situation which invoked due process
principles. 411 U.S. at 432.
65 411
U.S. at 435. After the decision in Russell was handed down, the reaction by
the lower federal courts was varied. The Fifth Circuit continued to find entrapment
when an illegal drug was furnished to the defendant by distinguishing Russell on the
basis of its facts. There the agent had supplied a legal ingredient and not the contraband itself, see United States v. Soto, 504 F.2d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Mosley, 496 F.2d 1012, 1015-16 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d
161, 163 (5th Cir. 1974); other circuits found Russell controlling, see, e.g., United States
v. Jett, 491 F.2d 1078, 1081 (1st Cir. 1974). See also \lurchison, supra note 43, at
596-601.
66 411 U.S. at 436. In two dissenting opinions, four justices expressed dissatisfaction
with the majority's result, reiterating the need for an approach which focuses on government conduct. Justice Douglas, voicing agreement with the Roberts-Frankfurter approach, stated that "[flederal agents play a debased role when they become the instigators of the crime." Id. at 439. In the second dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart
wrote that without regard to defendant's predisposition, entrapment exists
when the agents' involvement in criminal activities goes beyond the mere offering of such an opportunity, and when their conduct is of a kind that could
induce or instigate the commission of a crime by one not ready and willing to
commit it.
Id. at 445.
67

Id. at 432.

425 U.S. 484 (1976). A jury found the defendant guilty and he appealed, alleging
error in the failure to instruct the jury that they must acquit if they found the drug was
68
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the defendant urged that the language in Russell, to the effect that
due process could be violated by "outrageous" government conduct,
was applicable to him because a government informer had supplied
the heroin, which he, in turn, had sold to government agents. 69 The
Court, finding the difference between Hampton and Russell to be
"one of degree, not of kind," rejected his attempt to invoke due process principles. 70 It was stated that the sole defense available to an
accused who had unknowingly encouraged government participation
in a crime would be a claim of entrapment. 7 1 Thus, a plurality of the
Court foreclosed any possibility of a predisposed defendant ever asserting a due process defense. 7 2 In a dissenting opinion, Justice
Brennan stated that he would find entrapment as a matter of law
when the government is found to have supplied the contraband, and
would allow for the applicability of due process principles "where the
73
Government's conduct is as egregious as in this case."
The trend of the lower federal courts toward the acceptance of

supplied by the informer. Id. at 487-88. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the conviction, stating, "we do not think that the extent of Government participation in the commission of the crime, under the facts claimed by Hampton, warrants an
entrapment defense based upon Government conduct, apart from defendant's predisposition." United States v. Hampton, 507 F.2d 832, 836 (8th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 425 U.S. 484
(1976).
19 425 U.S. at 488-89. The Court noted that in light of the standards established by
Sorrells and Sherman, Hampton's situation "does not qualify as one involving 'entrapment' at all." Id. at 489. Citing the findings in Russell, the Court stated that in circumstances where the defendant was predisposed it had eliminated the possibility of an
entrapment defense based solely on "governmental misconduct." Id. at 488-89.
70 Id.

at 489-90.

71Id. Since Hampton had already admitted his predisposition to commit the crime,
he was foreclosed from an entrapment defense. Id. The alternative due process claim
was similarly rejected on the basis that no recognized constitutional right of the defendant was violated. Id. at 490-91. The plurality then noted that the proper "remedy lies
• . . in prosecuting the police under the applicable provisions of state or federal law." Id.
at 490.
72 See id. at 488-90; Tanford, Entrapment: Guidelines for Counsel and the Courts,
13 CpIM. L. BULL. 5, 16 (1977). Mr. Justice Powell, in a concurrence in which Justice
Blackmun joined, was unwilling to find that Russell "ha[d] gone so far" as to bar a
predisposed defendant from employing constitutional safeguards. 425 U.S. at 492-93.
Justice Powell agreed with the plurality opinion that Hampton's situation did not
"constitut[e] a per se denial of due process," id. at 491 (emphasis in original), but recognized that either the supervisory power of the courts or constitutional principles
could be invoked to bar a conviction where the government conduct is "outrageous," id.
at 493-95.
73 425 U.S. at 499. The dissent attempted to distinguish Russell on the grounds that
in that case the ingredient supplied by the agent was legal, and that the operation in
Russell was a continuing scheme independent of the government's participation. Id. at
497-98.
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an objective approach did not take root in New Jersey prior to
74
Talbot. The standard employed by the state's courts was subjective,
although the New Jersey supreme court, in State v. Dolce, 75 did base
the defense on a public policy rationale similar to that expounded by
Justices Roberts and Frankfurter. 76 In Dolce, the defendant was arrested for possessing certificates of stolen vehicles after he had willingly accompanied an undercover agent to a machine which could
validate them. 77 Citing Sorrells and Sherman, the court held evidence of the accused's "own cupidity and predisposition" admissible, 78 but implicitly rejected a statutory construction basis for the
defense in favor of the rationale that "the courts will not allow their
process to be used to consummate a wrong. ' 79 The court also noted
the controversy over whether judge or jury should decide the question but declined to disturb the practice of submitting factual questions to the jury because the matter was not in issue.80
In Talbot, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reasoned that it
was not bound by either Russell or Hampton, since those decisions
involved the "construction of ... federal statutes." 8' The majority
also distinguished Dolce and the "few" New Jersey decisions concerning entrapment on the basis that, although these cases had "adverted
74The position of the New Jersey courts in regard to entrapment was summarized
by the supreme court in State v. Dolce, 41 N.J. 422, 197 A.2d 185 (1964):
There are few cases in New Jersey dealing with entrapment. Those to be
found in the reports indicate that assertion of the defense requires no departure
at trial from the conventional procedure ordinarily followed in criminal cases,
i.e., full trial by court and jury unless the jury is waived, And when the trial is
by jury, if a factual issue is presented as to the defense of entrapment, it is
resolved by the jury like any other defense....
•..When a defendant interposes the defense of entrapment, the State may
introduce evidence of his predisposition to commit crime. The purpose is to
demonstrate that he was not an innocent person who would not have committed the offense were it not for the proposal and inducement of the police officers. Predisposition is evidenced by previous conviction of crime, reputation for
criminal activities, ready compliance with minimal inducement, or easy yielding to the opportunity to commit the offense.
Id. at 433, 197 A.2d at 191 (citations omitted).
7541 N.J. 422, 197 A.2d 185 (1964).
76Id. at 430-32, 197 A.2d at 189-90. The public policy basis for entrapment was
utilized by New Jersey prior to Sorrells as early as 1914. See generally State v.
Dougherty, 86 N.J.L. 525, 534-35, 93 A. 98, 102 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 88
N.J.L. 209, 96 A. 56 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915).
7741 N.J. at 426-27, 197 A.2d at 187-88.
78 Id. at 429, 433, 197 A.2d at 189, 191.
79Id. at 431, 197 A.2d at 190.
80 Id. at 433, 437-38, 197 A.2d at 191, 193-94.
8171 N.J. at 166-67, 364 A.2d at 12.
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to the subjective standard," the courts had not been confronted with
"egregious police action." ' 2 Thus free to create its own "contours of
the defense," the court held that entrapment occurs as a matter of
law when a defendant is furnished contraband by an informer with
the aim of having the defendant resell it to an undercover agent,
notwithstanding predisposition on the part of the defendant. 83 This
rule applied even though the informer's actions were "unknown to
and contrary to" police guidelines. 84 Moreover, the court expressly
invoked a due process standard by basing its holding "on the principle of fundamental fairness."85
In a concurring opinion, Justice Schreiber cautioned against a
blanket application of the majority's holding.8 6 He feared that a justifiable conviction of a defendant engaged in an illegal business could
be voided if the police action "coincidentally triggers" criminal
enterprise. 87 The Justice further noted that the possibility created by
the majority's holding was at variance with the proposed New Jersey
Penal Code (Code)88 which requires that the criminal activity be " 'a
Id. at 167, 364 A.2d at 12-13; see notes 33-39 supra and accompanying text.
83 71 N.J. at 167-68, 364 A.2d at 12-13. While noting that predisposition is "[o]rdinarily . . . a relevant factor," the court found that the importance of defendant's intent
decreases as government involvement increases, until a point is reached where police
conduct is so " 'outrageous' " that a conviction cannot be sustained. Id. at 167-68, 364
A.2d at 12-13; accord, State v. Sainz, 84 N.M. 259, 261, 501 P.2d 1247, 1249 (Ct. App.
1972). The "point" at which official activity is no longer tolerable is to be determined
by the trial judge. 71 N.J. at 168, 364 A.2d at 13.
84 71 N.J. at 168, 364 A.2d at 13. The appellate division had found prejudicial error
in the trial court's instructions to the jury that they must find that the police acknowledged and consented to the agent's activities in order to sustain the defense of entrapment. State v. Talbot, 135 N.J. Super. 500, 509-10, 343 A.2d 777, 782 (App. Div. 1975),
aff'd, 71 N.J. 160, 364 A.2d 9 (1976); see notes 6-9 supra and accompanying text. It is
commonly held that the government cannot benefit from the wrongful activity of the
informer and then disclaim responsibility on the basis of ignorance. See, e.g., Sherman
v. United States, 356 U.S. at 374-75; United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903, 905 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973). But see United States v. Wilson, 501 F.2d 1080,
1081 (8th Cir. 1974). A comprehensive study of the use of the informer in apprehending
criminals may be found in Donnelly, supra note 23.
85 71 N.J. at 168, 364 A.2d at 13.
8 Id. at 169-72, 364 A.2d at 13-15. Justice Schreiber urged that in cases where the
agent supplies the drug, a distinction must be made between "a professional engaged in
the criminal enterprise" and an individual involved in a single transaction. Id. at
169-70, 364 A.2d at 14.
87 Id. at 171, 364 A.2d at 15. Justice Schreiber cited Russell, approvingly, as an
example of a situation in which the defense of entrapment was denied to a defendant
"engaged in an ongoing course of illicit conduct." Id. at 169-70, 364 A.2d at 14.
88 1 NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE § 2C:2-12 (Proposed Final Draft 1971). This revision
of the penal code is currently before the Legislature for decision. See N.J. Assembly Bill
No. 642 (introduced Feb. 19, 1976).
82
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direct result' " of the governmental action. 8 9 Before invalidating specific police conduct, Justice Schreiber urged consideration of "all the
circumstances" surrounding the offense. 90
The majority in Talbot attempted to narrowly circumscribe its
holding by stating that entrapment as a matter of law occurs when (1)
authorities furnish a defendant with an illegal drug (2) with the object
of arranging a sale to an undercover officer (3) "which sale is then consummated. '"91 A defendant who shows these elements is entitled to
a finding of entrapment. 92 However, the majority's reliance upon the
"fundamental fairness" 93 rationale might conceivably support a finding
of entrapment, as a matter of law, in the case of a defendant who
cannot prove all of the Talbot elements, but who, nevertheless, has
been the victim of some other form of unconscionable police con94
duct.
Justice Schreiber's concurring opinion noted that the majority
holding provides little leeway once a governmental supply of contraband has been shown, and he questioned whether it was necessary for
the court to proceed so far. 95 Not only has the proposed Code's pro89 71 N.J. at 171-72, 364 A.2d at 15 (quoting from 1 NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE
§ 2C:2-12(a) (Proposed Final Draft 1971)). The Code provides, in relevant part, that
entrapment occurs when an officer "induces or encourages and, as a direct result,
causes another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense." Id.
90 71 N.J. at 171, 364 A.2d at 15. The concurring Justice suggested that the court
consider such factors as "the nature of the crime, difficulty of apprehension, and the
problem of obtaining witnesses," instead of merely focusing on whether the agent supplied the contraband. Id.
91Id. at 168, 364 A.2d at 13. Upon a showing of these facts, the court will not
investigate the defendant's predisposition or whether the furnishing of the contraband
occurred with the consent or knowledge of the police. Id.
92 Id. at 168, 364 A.2d at 13. An additional element required is that the testimony
concerning the government agent's furnishing of the drug must be uncontradicted in
order to establish entrapment as a matter of law. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
at 373; State v. Boccelli, 105 Ariz. 495, 497, 467 P.2d 740, 742 (1970) (en banc). See also
People v. Strong, 21 111. 2d 320, 325-26, 175 N.E.2d 765, 767-68 (1961). Once the defendant has testified to facts which would excuse him, the government has the burden
of coming forward with contrary evidence; failure to meet this burden warrants a finding for the defendant. See United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903, 904 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973); State v. McKinney, 108 Ariz. 436, 441, 501 P.2d 378,
383 (1972).
9371 N.J. at 168, 364 A.2d at 13.
94 See id.
95See id.at 169-72, 364 A.2d at 13-15. Justice Schreiber relied upon an article
authored by Professor Roger Park for the proposition that " '[m]echanical application of
the rule' " absolving a guilty defendant when the government supplies the contraband
might inhibit " 'legitimate law enforcement,' " as, for example, when large-scale drug
operations are involved. Id. at 170, 364 A.2d at 14 (quoting from Park, The Entrapment
Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 164, 191 (1976)). However, Professor Park also acknowl-
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vision concerning " 'coincidental' " police misconduct been "substantially undercu[t]," but the release of a defendant who successfully
shows a governmental supply of contraband may now be constitutionally mandated even when the totality of the circumstances indicates
culpability. 96 Should the proposed Code be enacted into law in its
present form, the court will undoubtedly be called upon later to resolve both the inconsistencies and the unanswered questions created
by this holding.
Many of the variances which exist between the proposed Code
and the Talbot holding appear to stem from the majority's conclusion
that if contraband is supplied by the police, a finding of entrapment
is mandated. 9 7 For instance, in the "ordinary" entrapment case, i.e.,
where furnishing of contraband is not involved, the Code calls for the
complete abandonment of prediposition in favor of concentration
upon police activity. 98 In contrast, Talbot apparently retains predisposition as a factor to be considered and balanced against the level of
official involvement. 99 Thus, under Talbot, the prosecution is still
free to introduce rebuttal evidence of predisposition when a defenedged that
[tihere will normally be no need to provide the target with contraband; a person who has been trafficking will have his own sources. Indeed, the fact that an
agent found it expedient to provide contraband raises a suspicion that the target
was not predisposed.
Id.
, 71 N.J. at 171, 364 A.2d at 15 (Schreiber, J., concurring). It may well be that the
fundamental fairness basis employed by the court is an attempt to "immunize" its holding from legislative revision. See generally Comment, The Viability of the Entrapment
Defense in the ConstitutionalContext, 59 IOWA L. REV. 655, 661-62 (1974). Should the
court, after passage of the Code, be faced with a situation in which a defendant cannot
claim entrapment "as a direct result" of police activity, but can show a supply of contraband, then at least two conceivable alternatives exist. 1 NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE
§ 2C:2-12(a) (Proposed Final Draft 1971). First, the statute could be declared violative
of due process and unconstitutional. Second, the court, utilizing language in its own
holding, could distinguish the above-mentioned situation by balancing the nature of
police conduct with the predisposition of an accused:
[A]s the part played by the State in the criminal activity increases, the importance of the factor of defendant's criminal intent decreases, until finally a point
may be reached where the methods used by the State to obtain a conviction
cannot be countenanced, even though a defendant's predisposition is shown.
71 N.J. at 167-68, 364 A.2d at 13.
97 See 71 N.J. at 167-68, 364 A.2d at 12-13.
99 2 New Jersey Penal Code § 2C:2-12, Commentary, at 77 (Proposed Final Draft
1971). The legislature has recognized that by adopting the objective test of the Model
Penal Code, it would "overrule" all New Jersey cases which followed the subjective
approach because "[t]he MPC formulation . . . speaks only to the conduct of the police."
Id.
99 See 71 N.J. at 167-68, 364 A.2d at 12-13.
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dant claims he was entrapped by police action other than the supplying of contraband. 0 0 Again, in the "ordinary" case, Talbot casts entrapment as an affirmative defense and retains the jury to decide the
issue, while the Code makes the defendant bear the entire burden of
proof and calls for a trial court ruling in all instances.101
Besides disagreement over the approach to be employed in conventional claims, the Code and Talbot also offer disparate rationales
for the defense. The comment to the Code justified its adopted procedure as a specific method to provide a " 'full deterrent effect' " on
unacceptable police practices. 10 2 The Talbot court, on the other
hand, rested its decision on due process considerations which are
embodied in "commonly accepted standards of decency of conduct to
which government must adhere."' 1 3 Presumably, the Talbot court
concluded that this rationale would not be undercut by an entrap100 Id.

at 165-67, 364 A.2d at 11-13; accord, State v. Dolce, 41 N.J. at 433, 197 A.2d

at 191.
101 71 N.J. at 165, 364 A.2d at 11. As an affirmative defense, an accused claiming
entrapment must bear the burden of introducing evidence to show he was entrapped,
but "the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt . .. that [the] defendant committed the crime" without excessive police inducement. Id.; accord, State v. Dolce, 41 N.J.
at 432, 197 A.2d at 190-91. The Code, however, provides that
a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment.
The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the Court in the absence of the jury.
I NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE § 2C:2-12(b) (Proposed Final Draft 1971). In light of
Talbot, entrapment remains an affirmative defense where the supply of contraband is
involved, but the issue of whether the defendant was entrapped by egregious police
conduct will be decided by the court. 71 N.J. at 165, 168, 364 A.2d at 11, 13.
On the relative merits of having either judge or jury decide the issue, the Brown
Commission Report stated in favor of a judicial determination that
[m]ost scholarly writing .. . favors a judicial determination of entrapment,
whereas the courts hew closely to the majority view in Sorrells and Sherman,
...which leaves the question to the jury, except in those rare instances where
entrapment is established as a matter of law. It is possible that a judicial pronouncement on this subject will present the police with a more definite guide
to future action, than will a jury verdict, which may or may not be directly
related to the entrapment defense. After all, the entrapment defense is
grounded in a serious desire to deter police misconduct. Thus, standards are
necessary and the courts are most skilled in this pursuit.
Concededly, entrapment will raise a host of factual issues, but the courts
always resolve such matters when their jurisdiction is challenged. And the
court is apt to decide factual issues unencumbered by the prejudice that will
inevitably arise from proof of the defendant's predisposition.
BROWN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 24, at 325 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in
original).
12 2 NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE § 2C:2-12, Commentary, at 77 (Proposed Final
Draft 1971).
103 71 N.J. at 168, 364 A.2d at 13.
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ment effected by methods other than the supply of contraband.
It is unclear why the New Jersey supreme court dichotomized
the state's entrapment law providing, in effect, different sets of rules
dependent upon the nature of the police action.' 0 4 Perhaps this stems
from a feeling that supplying a defendant with the means to commit
the crime is an especially "egregious" activity.1 0 5 The absence of logic
in so restricting the defense becomes apparent, however, when one
considers the defendant trapped not by a specific act, but by a general pattern of flagrant police action. Although Talbot did not address
this question, it should, despite its concentration on the supply of
contraband, provide support for the defense of one entrapped by excessive police conduct. 10 6 If the court fully intended its statement
about "fundamental fairness," then the eventual extension of Talbot
10 7
lies in its own proclaimed rationale.
Notwithstanding the confusion resulting from judicial and proposed legislative action, the New Jersey law on entrapment can be
summarized briefly. A judge-determined finding of entrapment
should be made when a supplying of contraband by law enforcement
officers is uncontrovertedly shown.' 0 8 When a factual question exists
as to whether the contraband was supplied by the government, that
issue apparently should be presented for jury determination. ' 0 9 How'0
Most other state courts which have adopted the objective approach have made it
applicable in all instances. In State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1974), for example, the court stated:
We believe and hold this is the standard which should be adopted in Iowa.
It shall apply to the case sub judice, to all cases still appealable or on appeal in
which the issue has been properly raised below, and of course to all cases
subsequently tried....
Id. at 382; accord, People v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7, 22, 210 N.W.2d 336, 341 (1973).
105 See 71 N.J. at 168, 364 A.2d at 13; Park, supra note 95, at 190 & n.86, 191. The
courts have expressed particular outrage at this form of activity. See, e.g., People v.
Strong, 21 111. 2d 320, 172 N.E.2d 765 (1961), where the court stated:
[W]e cannot condone the action of one acting for the government in supplying
the very narcotics that gave rise to the alleged offense . . . . This is more than
mere inducement. In reality the government is supplying the sine qua non of
the offense.
Id. at 325, 172 N.E.2d at 768 (emphasis in original).
106 See 71 N.J. at 167-68, 364 A.2d at 13.

Id.
lo Id.
109 See id.; 31 L. ARNOLD, NEW JERSEY PRACTICE § 1023, at 771 & n.31 (1976). The
107

Talbot holding has been incorporated into the model jury charges presently in use,
along with the comment that
[t]his charge may also be adapted to situations where the defense alleges that
burglar tools, counterfeit dies or other materials necessary to the commission of
the crime in question were in fact furnished by the law enforcement officials
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ever, in a case not involving the furnishing of contraband, a controverted claim of entrapment to be resolved by the jury. 1 10 The trial
judge in this situation instructs the jury that an initial showing of entrapment from the evidence set forth from either side places "the
burden . . .upon the State to prove beyond a resonable doubt that the
defense of entrapment is untrue.""' As Talbot indicates, predisposi112
tion remains a factor which the state can use to meet its burden.
The Talbot decision represents an attempt by the New Jersey
supreme court to inhibit the police practice of furthering the commission of an offense by supplying the required means. Moreover, the
state legislature has been advised plainly enough that the state supreme court will be the final arbiter of the law on entrapment.
Should the legislature choose to disregard the thoughts expressed by
the justices, then "due process" will await the arrival of any contrary
statute in the state courts.
Olivia Belfatto
and agent or informant.
NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON MODEL JURY CHARGES, CRIMINAL, NEW
JERSEY MODEL JURY CHARGE, CRIMINAL § 3.141, at 3 (approved Feb. 1, 1977) [hereinafter cited as JURY CHARGE] (entrapment charge).
110 71 N.J. at 165, 364 A.2d at 11. See JURY CHARGE, supra note 107, § 3.141, at 3.
111 JURY CHARGE, supra note 107, § 3.141, at 2.
11271 N.J. at 167, 364 A.2d at 12. See JURY CHARGE, supra note 107, § 3.141, at 1.

